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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
EARL W. SADLEIR,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vs.-

Case No. 837 4

1\iELVIN G. KNAPTON,
Defendant and Appellant.

PETITION OF DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT
FOR REHEARING

TO THE HONORABLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND
JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH:
The defendant and appellant above named respectfully petitions this Court for a rehe.aring on its opinion
issued in the above entitled cause on the 16th day of April,
1956. This petition is based upon the following grounds:
1. The record warrants a more precise st.atement

of the facts.
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2. A fraud upon the Court should not be condoned.
3. The decision ignores the clear meaning of the
Statute.
The attorneys for the defendant and appellant hereby certify that this petition for rehearing is made in good
faith and not for the purpose of delay.
Respectfully submitted,
GUSTIN, RICHARDS,
MATTSSON & EVANS
Attorneys for Defendant and
Appellant

ARGUJ\!IENT
It is recognized by the decision that the above case
is one of first impression with this Court on the construction of the controlling Statute, Section 30-3-9, Utah
Code Annotated 1953. We believe it significant that the
jury's verdict was six to two and that the decision of
this Court is three to two. The thin line between what
is right and what is wrong, both on the fact and on the
law, warrants, we believe, a closer scrutiny of the record
and of the law. The Iowa case of Hamilton v. McNeill,
150 Iowa 470, 129 N.W. 480, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 604, covers
practically every phase of this kind of litigation, including legislative intent. Certainly some of the language
of the Iowa Court merits specific rejection or approval.
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POINT I.
THE RECORD WARRANTS A MORE PRECISE STATEMENT OF THE FACTS.

The opinion states that in Decen1ber of 1953 plaintiff's wife revealed to him. that she \Vas "moody" for defendant. It is respectfully submitted that the record does
not support the statement. Sadleir testified that his wife
"was a little mopy at times, but, then, that was the same
as she always had been." (R. 26). And th.at between
Christmas and the 8th of January, 1954, his wife "got
real moody there for a little while." (R. 27). But there
is no direct statement in the record that plaintiff's wife
"revealed to him that she was 'moody' for defendant."
As a matter of fact Sadleir does not purport to quote
his former wife on any feeling that she might have had
for the defendant and the record is silent in that regard.
From the testimony of I\frs. Sadleir in the divorce proceedings it appears that there were no affections to
alienate.
The opinion turns
dant into an agreement
until she could obtain a
and then to marry her

a unilateral statement of defento support plaintiff's former wife
diverce and to pay for the divorce
when the divorce was final.

Nowhere in the record is it shown that anyone agreed
to anything. It w.as a conversation between the two n1en.
The inference that Knapton supported the plaintiff's wife
or paid for the divorce is not supported by the record,
nor is the statement: "Thereupon 1\Irs. Sadleir left plaintiff's home and discontinued living with him, taking the
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children with her, and immediately thereafter conunenced
divorce proceedings." (Emphasis added). Sadleir's testimony, the only testimony on this point, is that Mrs.
Sadleir took the children to Mr. Sadleir's mother's home
to tell her that she was leaving; that Sadleir in turn went
to his mother's place and then took Mrs. Sadleir, ~Irs.
Sadleir's sister and the children to the latter's home a
couple of blocks away, and that the next morning Mrs.
Sadleir's parents came in from Wendover "and she went
out there for a week or so with them." (R. 31). It is
reasonable to suppose that l\1rs. Sadleir counseled with
her parents and that they intervened, but, in any event,
it cannot be said that the divorce action followed immediately upon the heels of the conversation between the
two men.
A stranger to the record would read from the opinion
a factual setting by far more prejudicial to the defendant
than is justified. In a case where the expression "illict
suitor" is coined, it is respectfully submitted that the
record should be strictly adhered to and that circumstances, conduct and unilateral expression should not be
placed in an unfair light.

POINT II.
A FRAUD UPON THE COURT SHOULD NOT BE CONDONED.

Mr. Justice Henriod, in his dissenting opinion, uses
strong language relative to the conduct of S.adleir and
states that he has been "found guilty of bamboozling and
perpetrating a fraud upon the court, concealing facts
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5
and then conveniently producing what he contends are
true, but unfound facts." The dissenting opinion charges
the main opinion with having condoned "a deliber.ate
fraud upon a divorce court." In these expressions we
most emphatically concur, but for the benefit of the Bench
and Bar we earnestly submit that more of the record
should be revealed so as to disclose the fraud actually
practiced upon the divorce court.

1ew1nl
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1Q ~b
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Sadleir was represented by counsel in the divorce
case .and permitted his default to be entered. He was
"legally told to be quiet" during the proceedings (R.
36). Sadleir heard his wife testify and criticize the
marriage and heard her say "His folks have been in
on everything we did, everything we bought; we had to
get their approval on practically everything we did." (R.
37). He heard her testify that she h.ad requested him
"on numerous occasions during the marriage to seek
another residence" away from his parents, and that she
was fearful in the interests of the children (R. 38). Sadlier heard his wife testify that "he doesn't seem to be
much of a man to get out on his own .and try and make
us a living and a home." And she answered "Yes" to
the question: "And, as a result, Mrs. Sadleir, have ;'on
lost all respect for your

husband~"

(R. 39-40). All this

was without protest from Sadleir in the forum where it
was his duty to speak if he denied the fact. The trial
judge unwittingly bec.ame a part and parcel to the suit
for alienation of affections which followed the divorce
decree by thirty days.
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Mr. Justice Crockett states in his opinion: "It would
be very unusual, if not inconceivable, that a husband
would sue for alienation of affections while still married
to his wife." The fact of the divorce was injected into
the instant case by plaintiff's testimony on direct examination (R. 31). Undoubtedly it was recognized as
part of plaintiff's prima facie case. If his testimony is
true in the instant case, then the divorce court was led
into error by plaintiff's silence.
Sadleir's mother and Sadleir's brother were in the
divorce court .at the time of Mrs. Sadleir's divorce as
onlookers (R. 70). Sadleir's parents, as the testimony
in the divorce proceeding discloses, had been "in on everything we did, everything we bought, we had to get their
approval on practically everything we did. vVhere we
went they went. We very seldon1 went on a trip or anywhere where we went by ourselves." (P. 4 Ex. 2-P).
Plaintiff's home was straight across the street from that
of his parents, and on nu1nerous occasions Mrs. Sadleir
asked her husband to seek another residence. As a result
of Sadleir's conduct his wife lost all respect for him.
(P. 4 Ex. 2-P).
True to form the Sadleir family took their seats in
the arena, the arena where one of the members of. this
Court states that a fraud on the trial court occurred. But
we ask: Why not set those facts out at least as a warning to others that some day a majority court might recognize such conduct as constituting a fraud upon the

court~
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In the instant matter one's idea of the integrity of
judicial proceedings cannot help but be jolted. In fairness to the litigants and to the case as a precedent we
respectfully submit that the presence of Sadleir in the
divorce court and his attitude concerning the proceedings, coming from his own lips as a witness in the alienation case, w.arrants specific reference.

wa1lw

POINT III.
THE DECISION IGNORES THE CLEAR MEANING OF
THE STATUTE.
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The decision as written by :Mr. Justice Wade expressly recognizes that the right against alienation could
not exist if there had been no marriage, but ipse dixit
states that the plaintiff's right is not "acquired by marriage." l\{r. Justice Crockett .asserts the "illicit suitor"
analogy and then goes on to say: "It seems to me unquestionable that it (the statute) is to be considered in
context with the other statutes in the title on Husband
and Wife and that it relates solely to their rights inter
se." (Emphasis ours). The fallacy of both statements
is most ably pointed out by Mr. Justice Henriod and
concurred in by Mr. Justice Worthen.
If the doctrine of stare decisis has any place whatsoever in our philosophy, it seems to us appropriate that
the issue be raised whenever a court would seem to
indicate an .attitude of disdain for the Legislative intent
and for judicial precedents as well.
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In Hamilton v. McNeill, supra, it is said:
"We think it must be said that plaintiff's
right, if any, to maintain this action, is necessarily a right 'acquired by the marriage.' The
cause of action is one which could arise only out
of and by virtue of the marriage relation. On
the face of the statute, therefore, the plaintiff,
having been adjudged in the divorce decree to
be the guilty party, forfeited 'all rights acquired
by the marriage.' Levins v. Sleator, 2 G. Greene,
604; Lucas v. Sawyer, 17 Iowa, 517; Maynard v.
Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 8 Sup. Ct. 723, 31 L. Ed. 654;
Nolin v. Pearson, 191 Mass. 283, 77 N. E. 890, 4
L.R.A. (N.S.) 643, 114 Am. St. Rep. 605."
Furthermore, the Iowa court points out that the forfeiture which the legislature deemed to be in the public interest could not be avoided by a showing that such forfeiture would operate to the benefit "in a negative sense
of an undeserving person." This reasoning we point to
upon well documented authority as dissipating the illusory "illicit suitor" expression of ~fr. Justice Crockett.
We deem it not to lie in the mouth of any Judge or any
Court to question the propriety of a clear and unequivocal
expression of the legislature, except upon basic principles
of constitutionality. The expression of public policy is
voiced in the instant matter by the legislature and, as
1fr. Justice Henriod points out, by the legislatures of
fourteen states, including Colorado, Nevada and Wyoming. It is not enough to say that this is not the "kind of
a right" which the statute contemplates. A mere assertion of the Judge or Court should not prevail over
the plain language of the statute.
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Mr. Justice Crockett goes further and says that the
statute must be considered "in context" with the other
statutes in the title on Husband and 'Vife and that it
relates "solely to their rights inter se." Does the Learned
Judge mean that divorce and all of its consequences,
and of marriage and its relationship, are related "solely
to" the man and the woman~ If so, there has been discarded the entire concept of marriage and divorce. We
have been given to believe from the writings of the past
that the State legislates as to both marriage and divorce
in the public interest and that the relation of husband
and wife, while formed by contract, derives both its rights
and duties from a source higher than any contract of
which the parties are capable.
The parties cannot contract marriage in this State
without the sanction of the State, nor can they amend,
modify, restrict, enlarge or release without similar sanction. "It is an institution, in the maintenance of which
in its purity the public is deeply interested, for it is
the foundation of the family and of society, without which
there would be neither civilization nor progress." Furthermore: "We are not at liberty to inquire into the
wisdom of our existing law on this subject, nor into the
expediency of such frequent interference by the Legislature. We can only inquire into the constitutionality of
the Act under consideration." The quotations in this
paragraph, as well as the philosophy of marriage and
divorce under Legislative edict, are found in JJJaynard
v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 8 Sup. Ct. 723, 31 L. Ed. 654, cited
by the Iowa court in Hamilton v. McNeill, supra.
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A rehearing in this case should be granted if for no
other reason than to emasculate the reference to the
Court's "illicit suitor" and the concept that the statutes
under the title Husband and ·wife relate "solely to their
rights inter se."
CONCLUSION
The op1n1on as it now stands charts a course for
those who would conspire to prey upon human emotions.
We are more impressed with the blue print that the
malingering litigant can follow than with the "illicit
suitor" hypothesis. It is significant that before the case
of Wilson v. Oldroyd, 1 Utah 2d 362, 267 P. 2d 759, suits
for alienation of affections were practically unheard of
in this State. We cannot close our eyes to the fact that
several such actions now pend in our District Court~.
The fact that fourteen States, particularly neighboring
States, abandon this type of litigation is significant as
an expression of public policy. The Iowa Court tells us
that Utah has relegated this type of litigation to the
ash heap .as far back as 1852. The dearth of such actions prior to the Oldroyd case would seem to us to mean
that others have interpreted Section 30-3-9 as we have.
The Oldroyd case did not have the "guilty party" element,
nor was there such a plain fraud practiced upon the
divorce court.
In the interest of rationaliz.ation a rehearing should
be granted where this Court will have the opportunity
to take exception to the reasoning of the Iowa Court in
a manner that will impress the reader with the logic of
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statutory interpretation. A rehearing should be had on
both the fact and the law. In .a case of first impression
it should be pointed out the purpose, if any, served by
Section 30-3-9. This State, as in Iowa, has other statu.
tory provisions on questions of alimony, the custody of
children, the termination of property rights vested and
inchoate in the event of divorce. Our "guilty party"
statute must serve some purpose and, unless it is given
effect under the circumstances of the instant matter, it
would appear that this Court holds that the statute has
no purpose. A rehearing should be granted to point out
the purpose and effect of the statute.

:um
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Respectfully submitted,

th'

GUSTIN, RICHARDS,
MATTSSON & EVANS
Attorneys for Defendant and
Appellant
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